6 pp

~~RESTRICTED~~

10 pp.

Return to China Branch

CHINA BRANCH
Office of the Chief
FILE COPY

094.3
21093
no. 4963 PV
2

CHINA'S SEARCH FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

8 pp.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Authority State Ltr. 3-31-76 70177-54
By fyd NARS, Date 12-14-76

PRELIMINARY VERSION

2 pp

OIR Report No. 4963 (PV)

2 pp

May 24, 1949

10 pp

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LIBRARY
AND
REFERENCE SERVICES
DEC 8 - 1949
LR FILE COPY
PLEASE RETURN

THIS IS AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT; NOTHING IN IT IS TO BE CONSTRUED AS A STATEMENT OF U. S. OR DEPARTMENTAL POLICY OR AS A RECOMMENDATION OF ANY GIVEN POLICY.

10 pp

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Division of Research for Far East

5 pp

DISTRIBUTED BY
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH

5 pp

~~RESTRICTED~~

RESTRICTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

~~Rough Draft~~

~~CHINA'S SEARCH FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY~~

~~CONTENTS:~~

Page

The Fall of the Manchu Dynasty . . .

I. ~~Historical Background~~

II. Proposals for a New Political System . . . . . .

A. The Kuomintang ~~Chinese Solution~~ Program (~~Sun Yat-sen~~) . . .

~~1. Immediate Objectives~~

~~2. Long Term Objectives~~

~~3. Tactics of Revolution~~

~~4. Chiang K'ai-shek's Interpretation of Sun Yat-sen's Principles.~~

B. The ~~Chinese~~ Communist ~~Party's Solution~~ Program . . . . . .

~~1. Immediate Objectives~~

~~2. Long Term Objectives~~

~~3. The Tactics of Revolution~~

III. ~~Outline of~~ Kuomintang-Communist Relations (1920-1944) . .

A. Founding of the Communist Party and Reorganization of the Kuomintang

B. ~~The~~ Kuomintang-Communist Collaboration, 1924-1927 . . .

C. Civil War 1927-1936 . . . . . .

D. Background of the Kuomintang-Communist Entente

E. The Kuomintang-Communist Entente 1937-1944

1. Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee

2. Manifesto of the Chinese Communist Party

3. Statement by Chiang K'ai-shek

4. Implementation of the Agreements

5. Deterioration of Kuomintang-Communist Relations

6. Kuomintang-Communist Negotiations

~~IV. The Situation in September 1944~~

~~A. The War Against Japan~~

~~B. Post-war Considerations~~

IV. ~~C~~. The Outlook for Peace and Stability in China in September 1944.

When this study outlives its usefulness to you, please return it to:

Department of State
Office of Intelligence Research (OIR)
626 State Annex 1
Washington, D. C.

RESTRICTED

Bth
Calm
Meeley
cc: Sprouse 5/24/49 By S.H.

DRF/C file copy
May 24, 1949

RESTRICTED

DRAFT

CHINA'S SEARCH FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

I. The Fall of the Manchu Dynasty — center, caps

The difficulties of governing China in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were compounded by a double set of circumstances. The Manchu dynasty, which had ruled China since the seventeenth century, was declining in strength and appeared to be entering the last phase of the centuries-old "dynastic cycle," in which old dynasties fell and new dynasties rose to power while the characteristics of imperial rule remained virtually unchanged. Judged by this traditional scheme of Chinese history, rebellions such as those that took place during the 1850's, or defeats at the hands of foreign powers ("barbarians") such as those suffered by the Manchus in 1842 and 1857, should have caused political power and the "mandate of heaven" to be transferred to another dynasty. Imperial China, however, was faced not only with the weakening of a dynastic system, but also with the impact of Western culture. China had assimilated many strands of foreign culture during its history, but had never been subjected to the full force of a culture equal or superior to its own.

The western impact on China had a paradoxical effect. On the one hand it demonstrated the weaknesses of the Manchu imperial system; while on the other hand it bolstered up the Manchu rule so that in spite of its

weaknesses it was able to continue ruling China. Making no ideological concessions to the west, the Manchus accepted or were forced to accept the technical aid of the west in preserving stability in China. This took the form of military aid (as during the T'ai-p'ing rebellion), of fiscal aid (as in the foreign administration of China's custom system), and of western sanction of the chiang yun (as implied in the treaty system built up in 1842-3 and in 1858-60). The most elaborate and conscious effort to sustain the traditional system through Western techniques was that of the "reform movements" of 1898 and after 1902, which proposed to preserve the imperial order through such devices as "practical" education, a modern army and navy, and a "constitution". The futility of these attempts was demonstrated by the revolution of 1911. Western ideas as well as Western techniques had penetrated China to such an extent that the traditional system could no longer adapt itself to changing conditions.

The imperial system collapsed in 1911, but the new political order that Sun Yat-sen and other Chinese leaders had hoped for did not materialize. No successor to the destroyed political power of the Manchus arose. China was subjected to a struggle among warlords, military cliques, reformers, and revolutionaries, as well as to numerous encroachments on its soveriegnty and territory by foreign powers, particularly by Japan. According to the historical pattern of the "dynastic

cycle" China was in a period of turmoil between dynasties.

But in addition to the traditional characteristics of a period of dynastic collapse -- warlordism, peasant unrest and rebellion, official corruption, financial disorder -- China was faced with a group of new political and social factors. China no longer was the "Middle Kingdom", the center of the known civilized world, able to integrate into its traditional system any foreign ("barbarian") idea that might come its way. The new ideologies of Christianity, democracy, nationalism, and socialism, were attacking the foundations of China's traditional social values. Under the impact of the new ideas, China's age-old xenophobia was transformed into active nationalism and became a potent force, mk quite unlike the half-superstitious and undirected anti-foreign outbursts of the Boxer Rebellion. New economic conditions were creating in the coastal cities a growing working class and a middle class of increasing power, both dependent upon the beginnings of a modern commercial and industrial system.

Attempts to create in China a western-type parliamentary government failed in 1913. Two attempts to reimpose upon China the old imperial system, the abortive efforts of Yuan Shih-k'ai to ascend the throne as the "Hung Hsien" ("Glorious constitutionalism") emperor in 1916 and the equally ill-fated Manchu "restoration" under warlord auspices in 1917, demonstrated the impossibility of a return to imperial rule. The warlords

and regional militarists who struggled for hegemony could win only local and transitory victories.

The new development that provided the background against which new efforts to regain peace and stability became possible was the upsurge of nationalism associated with the student movement of ~~of~~ May 4, 1919. Stimulated by affronts to China's integrity such as the "21 demands" by Japan in 1915 and the alleged slighting of China at the Paris peace conference in 1919, a wave of patriotic fervor arose among the students in Peking and spread throughout the student, merchant, and laboring classes of the coastal cities of China, and even to many peasants. A concurrent intellectual revival, including the use of the pai-hua or vernacular in place of the old classical language in literature and scientific writing, contributed to and reflected the incipient nationalism.

An ideological content for the intellectual movement was offered both by the Kuomintang, which tried to combine Western and Chinese traditions into a new system of government, and by the Chinese Communist Party, which advocated a social revolution on the Leninist model. Since the early 1920's China's prospects for peace and stability have depended upon the fluctuating relations between these two parties.

RESTRICTED

II. Proposals for a New Political System — center, caps 5

A. The Kuomintang Program

The ideological basis of the Kuomintang was formulated by Sun Yat-sen during his years of conspiring against the Manchu regime and were elaborated in various of his writings after the 1911 revolution. Sun tried to make use of Western thought while constructing a solution specifically for China which would retain what he thought valuable in the Chinese tradition. Sun's program, given practical interpretation by Chiang Kai-shek has continued to form the basis of Kuomintang political thought.

Sun conceived of the Chinese revolution as taking place in three distinct stages: (1) military unification, (2) "political tutelage", and (3) constitutionalism.[1] The first stage was to be a period of military dictatorship. As soon as order should be restored, the second stage was to begin, during which the people were to be trained by the Kuomintang in the exercise of their political rights. Finally, the third stage of constitutional government was to be reached and the revolutionary process completed.

1. Sun Yat-sen, "Outline (Fundamentals) of National Reconstruction" (Chien Kuo Ta Kang), given in Hsü, Leonard Sih Lien, Sun Yat-sen: His Political and Social Ideas, Los Angeles, 1933, and in Holcombe, Arthur N., The Chinese Revolution, Cambridge, 1930.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

The long-term program that Sun Yat-sen hoped to put into effect in China was detailed in many of his writings, of which the San Min Chu-I, the "Three Principles of the People", is the best known. Briefly, Sun's "Three Principles" are: (1) min ts'u, or "peoples nationalism", under which China would regain her national integrity and cultural unity; (2) min ch'üan, or "people's democracy", under which the people would exercise the "four political powers" (suffrage, recall, initiative, and referendum), by which they control the government, which in turn exercises the "five governing powers" (legislative, judicial, executive, "examination", and censorial); and (3) min sheng, or "people's livelihood", a vague form of socialism involving equalization of land ownership, regulation of capital, and avoidance of the class struggle.

Although he wrote at length about the reconstruction of China, Sun never detailed the tactics to be used in bringing this about. This deficiency in Sun's program, reinforced perhaps by the apparent similarity between Sun's idea of party "tutelage" and Lenin's idea of the role of the Communist Party in the "dictatorship of the proletariat", may have facilitated the introduction of Communist methods into the Kuomintang, during the later period of collaboration. Although Sun was impressed by the Bolshevik success in 1917 and although he accepted the tactical aid and advice of the Third International,

RESTRICTED

he never subscribed to Communist ideas such as the class struggle of the Marxian dialectic; indeed, Sun stressed repeatedly that the class struggle could and should be avoided in China. Sun invited and accepted the aid and collaboration of Soviet Russia, the Third International, and the Chinese Communist Party only with the expressed understanding that "the Communist order or even the Soviet system cannot actually be introduced into China"[1] and that "in joining the Kuomintang Communists of the Third International are to obey Kuomintang discipline"[2].

B. The Communist Program

The Chinese Communist program for the Chinese revolution is based on the Leninist theories of imperialism and revolution in semi-colonial countries. Although the theories have undergone changes at the hands of men like Mao Tse-tung, basically they correspond to the orthodox concepts of Lenin and Stalin. Innovations introduced by Chinese Communist theoreticians have concerned details of the revolutionary time-table and not basic revolutionary principles. The long-term objectives of Chinese Communism are the orthodox

1. Joint statement by Sun Yat-sen and Adolph Joffe, representative of Soviet Russia, in Shanghai, January 1923. See China Handbook 1937-1945, p. 66.
2. Statement by Li Ta-chao, one of the top-ranking Chinese Communists, ibid., p. 66.

Marxian goals of socialism and, ultimately, the classless, communist society.

In all countries the "bourgeois-democratic revolution" is considered by the Leninist theory to be "progressive" within certain limits, and even to be a prerequisite of eventual socialist revolution. The first objective of revolution in a colonial or semi-colonial country, however, is the liberation of the country from imperialism and feudalism. During this period even the development of capitalism is "progressive", but as the "bourgeois-democratic revolution" progresses, inherent class antagonisms will come to the fore and the bourgeoisie will come to ally itself with imperialism and feudalism against the working class. At this point, according to Lenin, collaboration between the bourgeoisie and the working class must cease. In a frequently quoted passage Lenin said:

> "The Communist International should form temporary understandings, even alliances, with the bourgeois democracy of the colonies and the backward countries, but not merge with it, unconditionally preserving the independence of the proletarian movement, even in its most embryonic form. ... We, as Communists, must and will support bourgeois emancipation movements in the colonial countries only in those cases when these movements are really revolutionary, when their representatives will not hinder us in educating and organizing the peasantry and the large masses of the exploited in the revolutionary spirit."[1]

1. Burns, E., Handbook of Marxism, New York, 1935, p. 896. The concluding sentence is used by Liu Shao-ch'i is his pronouncement "On Nationalism and Internationalism", broadcast by the North Shensi radio, November 9 and 10, 1948. Italicization is that given in Burns, op. cit.

The Chinese Communist advocacy of democracy during the early stages of the Chinese revolution must be considered in terms of the theory of "New Democracy" as propounded by Mao Tse-tung according to the Leninist formula. The Communist Party has a role to perform even during the "bourgeois-democratic" stage of the Chinese revolution:

> "The first stage of this revolution in colonial and semi-colonial countries -- though according to its social nature, it is fundamentally still a bourgeois-democratic one, of which the objective requirements still basically call for the clearance of the way to capitalistic development -- yet, despite this, this revolution is no longer the old, wholesale bourgeois-led revolution for the building of capitalist society and a state of the bourgeois-dictatorship type, but a new type of revolution, wholly or partly led by the proletariat, the first stage of which aims at the setting up of a new democratic society, a new state of the combined dictatorship of all classes. The fundamental character of this revolution will never vary until the arrival of the stage of Socialist revolution, though during its progress, it may pass through several minor stages in accordance with the possible changes in the attitude of enemies and allies."[1]

The tactics to be followed by the Chinese Communist Party during the early stages of the revolution are implicit in the Communist analysis of the nature of the "bourgeois-democratic revolution." The Communist Party will in theory ally itself with such parties, groups, or classes as it considers "progressive", in order to hasten the revolution against feudalism and imperialism.

---

1. Mao Tse-tung, "China's New Democracy", 1940, is included in the Appendix, 81st Congress, 1st Session, House Document No. 154, Part 3, The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, Supplement III.

But the great fear of the Communist Party is that it may lose the initiative and the leadership in the revolution to nationalists, reformers, or social-democrats. Communist tactics in China have steered a precarious course between the danger of "right opportunism" through which the initiative is lost, and that of "left extremism" which prematurely attempts to turn the "bourgeois-democratic revolution" into a socialist revolution and which causes the Communists to lose their influence in the "bourgeois" revolution before the socialist revolution can be successfully prosecuted.

RESTRICTED

11

III. Kuomintang - Communist Relations (1920-1945) — center, caps

A. Founding of the Communist Party and Reorganization of the Kuomintang

The first Communist groups in China were formed in Peking in 1919 and 1920 by Ch'en Tu-hsiu and various students, among whom was Mao Tse-tung. In 1920 at Baku, the Comintern convened a "Congress of Oriental Nations," at which China was represented, probably by Li Ta-chao. In May 1921 the Foundation meeting of the Chinese Communist Party was convened in Shanghai by Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao. During the following months the Chinese Communist Party was organized in various provinces and cities in China. Other Chinese Communist Parties were being formed among students in France, Germany, Russia, and Japan. In 1923 the Third Congress of the Communist Party met in Canton and, in accordance with a previous decision of the Comintern decided to enter the Kuomintang and create a "united front" against the northern militarists.

Meanwhile Sun Yat-sen, whose appeals for foreign aid had gone unanswered except by Soviet Russia and whose attempts to unify China through alliances with southern warlords had ended in his being forced to flee from Canton to Shanghai, was carrying on discussions with Adolph Joffe, a representative of Soviet Russia. In January 1923 Sun and Joffe issued a joint statement setting forth the principles under which

RESTRICTED

the Soviet Union and the Communist International were to aid the Chinese revolution during the ensuing years:

> "Dr. Sun Yat-sen holds that the Communist order or even the Soviet system cannot actually be introduced into China because there do not exist here the conditions for the successful establishment of either communism or sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr. Joffe, who is further of the opinion that China's paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve national unification and attain full national independence, and regarding this task, he has assured Dr. Sun Yat-sen that China has the warmest sympathy of the Russian people and can count on the support of Russia.,,,[1]

In partial fulfillment of this pledge of aid to Sun Yat-sen, Michael Borodin was sent to Canton in September 1923. Borodin quickly became the principal Kuomintang adviser. Under his direction the Kuomintang was reorganized at the First National Party Congress in January 1924 along the lines of the Russian Communist Party. At the same Congress it was resolved that Communists who were willing to take an oath of obedience to the Kuomintang authorities and who accepted the principles of the Kuomintang should be admitted to the Kuomintang as individuals. Li Ta-chao declared in this connection:

> "In joining the Kuomintang, communists of the Third International are to obey Kuomintang discipline and to participate in the national revolution. They have not the slightest intention of turning the Kuomintang into a communist party. Those Communists who join the Kuomintang do so as individuals and not on a party basis."[2]

1. China Handbook 1937-1945, p. 66
2. Ibid., p. 66

RESTRICTED

The objectives of the Kuomintang-Communist collaboration were declared to be the elimination of feudalism (i.e., at that time, the regime of the northern militarists) and the unification of the country, so that China would be able to stand up against foreign powers on a basis of equality.

B. Kuomintang - Communist Collaboration, 1924 - 1927

In collaboration with the Communists and the Comintern advisers, the Kuomintang was able to accomplish a shift from the tactics of conspiracy it had previously employed to those of revolution. The Kuomintang assumed the leadership over the new forces that had been unleashed by the spread of nationalism in China. Through the use of propaganda among the peasant and working masses, the Kuomintang was able to turn its military campaigns into popular uprisings. Its army was under the leadership of officers trained according to Soviet methods at the newly-established Whampoa Academy, and achieved a degree of efficiency not before equalled in modern China.

Following Sun Yat-sen's death in 1925 Chiang K'ai-shek, head of the Whampoa Academy, became the leading figure in the Kuomintang. In 1926 Chiang commanded the "Northern Expedition," a campaign to unify China by destroying the power of the warlords in the north. The revolutionary forces, preceded by propaganda corps, made rapid progress, and toward the end of the year the Kuomintang

RESTRICTED

capital was established at Hankow. A split in the party between the left wing at Hankow and the right wing under Chiang K'ai-shek's leadership, however, was becoming increasingly evident. Chiang was anxious to obtain the support of the middle class, particularly the commercial and banking community of Shanghai, while the Communists were attempting to turn the nationalist revolution into social revolutionary channels. In April 1927 Chiang set up a government at Nanking rivaling that of the left faction of the Kuomintang in Wuhan. Following the capture of Shanghai in March 1927 Chiang carried out a purge of the Communists in Shanghai, and somewhat later, conducted a similar purge in Canton.

Meanwhile the position of Borodin and the Communists in Wuhan was becoming more difficult. Conflicting and ill-advised orders from Moscow, which was at the time in the throes of the Stalin-Trotsky controversy, did not help the position of the Communists. By July the Communist cause had collapsed and Borodin was forced to retire from China, while purges of the Communist elements in Wuhan were being carried out.

C. Civil War 1927-1936

Although the Communists had been expelled from both wings of the party, unity within the Kuomintang was not restored until February 1928 when the party was reorganized under the control of Chiang K'ai-shek.

In June 1928 Kuomintang forces took Peking, completing the official unification of China and destroying the power of the northern warlords. After 1927, principal obstacle to stability in China was the existence of Chinese Communist districts and troops in open rebellion against the National Government of China.

In five major "bandit suppression campaigns" starting in December 1930, Chiang K'ai-shek attempted to exterminate the Communist forces in China. These campaigns were launched as follows:

(1) December 1930, under Lu Ti-p'ing
(2) May 1931, under Ho Ying-ch'in
(3) June 1931, under Chiang K'ai-shek
(4) April 1933, under Ch'en Ch'eng
(5) October 1933, under Chiang K'ai-shek (?)

The fourth and particularly fifth campaigns were planned with the assistance of the German military advisers Von Seeckt and after him Von Falkenhausen. Hundreds of thousands of troops were mobilized by the Nationalists. The campaigns did not succeed in exterminating the Communists, but Chiang was able to dislodge them from their bases in southern China, forcing them to flee to a base in the northwest by means of the "long march" in 1934-5. An incidental effect of the anti-Communist campaigns was the consolidation of Nationalist political control over many of the provinces that had previously maintained a degree of regional autonomy.

D. Background of the Kuomintang-Communist Entente

While the National Government of China was engaged in the problem of suppressing Communism, Japan embarked upon a series of encroachments

on Chinese territory, beginning with occupation of Manchuria in 1931 and leading up to the Marco Polo Bridge incident on July 7, 1937.

The Japanese actions aroused large sectors of Chinese opinion. The effect of Japan's aggression was similar in many ways to the effect of the earlier "21 demands" and the insistance by Japan at the Paris Peace Conference that it be ceded the German rights in Shantung peninsula. Again there was an upsurge of nationalism, particularly after 1935, when the loss of China's northern provinces was threatened. The revival of patriotism included most of politically conscious China -- elements ranging from warlords to students. Resistance against Japanese aggression became a popular slogan exploited not only by leftist intellectuals, such as those united in the National Salvation League, but also by dissident militarists.

The Chinese Communists had declared "war" on Japan as early as 1932 while their main force was still concentrated in Kiangsi, hundreds of miles from the nearest Japanese troops.[1] Although demands for a "united front" became factors in the Communist propaganda, the Chinese Communist Party at first offered no concessions to other groups to make possible a true "united front" but insisted on retaining full control over any anti-Japanese coalition. In 1935 the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern officially proclaimed the new policy of the "united front" and offered the cooperation of

1. See the "Circular Telegram of the Provisional Central Government of the Soviet Republic of China Declaring War against Japan" given in Yakhontoff, V. A., The Chinese Soviets, New York, 1934, pp. 236-8.

Communist parties to other groups willing to fight fascism. At that time, the Chinese Communist Party was criticised because it "has not yet succeeded in carrying out these tactics [of the united front] really consistently and without mistakes," and because the concept of the "united front" had not been broad enough. The Chinese Party was specifically censured for failing to unite with the dissident anti-Japanese militarists who rebelled against the Nanking government in Fukien Province in 1933.[1] Following the Congress the first serious offers of a "united front" were made to the Kuomintang. In January 1936 the Chinese Communist Party publicly offered the "hand of friendship" to Chiang K'ai-shek if he would take up arms against Japan. On August 26, 1936, the Chinese Communist Party proclaimed to the Kuomintang that "we are prepared to form a strong revolutionary united front with you as was the case during ... the great Chinese Revolution of 1925-1927... [that] is the only proper way to save our country today..."[2]

Coming at a time of growing patriotic resentment against Japanese aggression, the stepped-up demands for a "united front" by the CCP were an effective propaganda weapon for use against the troops to which

1. Wang Ming, The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonial Countries, Report to the VII World Congress of the Communist International, August 7, 1935, New York, 1935.

2. Military Intelligence Division, The Chinese Communist Movement, July 1945, Vol. I, p. 47, CONFIDENTIAL.

RESTRICTED

the National Government had assigned the task of "bandit suppression" in China's northwest. By the end of 1936 the army of Chang Hsueh-liang, the former warlord of Manchuria, was in no mood to fight against the Communist forces. In December 1936 Chiang K'ai-shek and his staff visited Sian in Shensi Province to map out a sixth "Bandit Suppression" campaign. Rather than carry out Chiang's orders to resume operations against the Communists, Chang Hsueh-liang decided to "arrest" the Generalissimo. In this move he was acting in league with the commander of the "Hsipei" (Northwestern) troops, Yang Hu-ch'eng, and the subordinate commanders of both the Hsipei army and his own "Tungpei" (Manchurian) army.

On the day of the coup the commanders of the "Tungpei" and "Hsipei" armies issued a circular telegram stating the demands of "national salvation," consisting of eight points:

1. "Reorganize the Nanking Government and admit all parties to share the joint responsibility of national salvation.
2. "End all civil war immediately and adopt the policy of armed resistance against Japan.
3. "Release the leaders of the patriotic movement in Shanghai.
4. "Pardon all political prisoners.
5. "Guarantee the people liberty of assembly.
6. "Safeguard the people's rights of patriotic organization and political liberty.

RESTRICTED

7. "Put into effect the will of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

8. "Immediately convene a National Salvation Conference."[1]

These points correspond generally to a program of "national salvation" advocated by the Communist Party in a telegram issued earlier in December. They also resemble a manifesto issued by the "All-China Federation of National Salvation" on May 31, 1936.

The details of the Sian incident have been obscured by the personal considerations involved in the available accounts. According to one version, Chang Hsueh-liang and some of his associates considered Chiang their leader and merely wished to awaken him to the danger of Japanese agression, although other more radical officers of the "Tungpei" army favored executing Chiang. The Chinese Communist Party, whose representatives were called to Sian immediately after Chiang's capture, apparently desired a "united front" with Chiang against Japan, but not a "united front" with the dissident militarists against Nanking. At any rate, on December 25, 1936 Chiang returned to Nanking, accompanied by his captor, Chang Hsueh-liang, who expressed sentiments of repentance. It seems certain that no agreement between Chiang K'ai-shek and the Communist or Tungpei leaders was signed. It seems equally certain, however, that an understanding of some kind was arrived at by the groups involved.

1. Edgar Snow, RED STAR OVER CHINA, op. cit., p. 407. The full text of the telegram is given in Bertram, J. M., First Act in China, p. 127, in a slightly variant translation.

RESTRICTED

After the Sian incident the establishment of an entente between the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang moved rapidly ahead.[1]

1. First-hand accounts of the Sian incident are given in Bertram, J. M., First Act in China, New York, 1938, and in General and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, China at the Crossroads, London, 1937, which was published in Shanghai as Sian, A Coup D'Etat and in New York as The Account of the Fortnight in Sian. See also Snow, Edgard, op. cit.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

B. The Kuomintang - Communist Patents, 1937-1941

The wartime amicable between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party was never formalized by a written alliance, but rests upon a series of parallel documents issued by the two parties, by which the Kuomintang announced the Chinese government's change in policy from one of military suppression of Communism to that of seeking a political settlement, and by which the Chinese Communist Party proclaimed the abandonment of forceful insurrection and sovietization in favor of cooperation with the government against Japanese aggression. These documents are (1) the telegram from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee on February 10, 1937; (2) the resolution of February 21, 1937 of the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee; (3) the manifesto of ~~the~~ September 22, 1937 by the Central Committee of the Communist Party; and (4) the statement on the following day by Chiang K'ai-shek commenting on the Communist manifesto.

1. Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee.

Shortly after Chiang K'ai-shek's return from Sian the Third Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang was held in Nanking. On February 10, 1937, five days before the session opened, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party addressed a telegram to the session which recommended a program

RESTRICTED

including the suspension of civil war, and the concentration of the national strength against external aggression, a guarantee of civil rights, the calling of a "national salvation" conference, the preparation for armed resistance, and improvement in living conditions of the people.[1] If these points were approved, the Communist Party declared itself prepared to make the following alterations in the policies that had characterized the activities of the CCP:

"(1) to stop our program of conducting armed uprisings throughout the country for the overthrow of the National Government in Nanking;

"(2) to change the Soviet Government into the Government of the Special Region of the Republic of China and the Red Army into the National Revolutionary Army under the direct leadership of the Military Affairs Commission in Nanking;

"(3) to enforce the thorough democratic system of universal suffrage within the special regions under the regime of the Government of the Special Regions;

"(4) to put an end to the policy of expropriating the land of the landlords and to execute persistently the common program of the anti-Japanese united front."[2]

The question of reconciliation with the Communists was dealt with at length by the Third Plenary Session in a resolution passed on February 21, 1937. The resolution reviewed the original leniency of Sun Yat-sen in admitting Communists to the Kuomintang in 1924 and

1. See Rosinger, ~~op. cit.~~ L.K. China's Wartime Politics, 1937-1944, Princeton, 1944, p. 25; Snow, op. cit; p. 467. Text in New China, Yenan, March 15, 1937. (not available).
2. ~~Quoted from Stuart's memo.~~ ROSINGER, op. cit.

RESTRICTED

their "subsequent treasonable and rebellious activities" up to the time of the session, when the "Communist bandits, reduced to straits in the Northwest have begun to announce alleged willingness to surrender". The resolution stated that the Kuomintang would give the Communists a chance to "reform" on four conditions:

1. Abolition of the separate army and its incorporation into the united command of the nation's armed forces.

2. Dissolution of the so-called "Chinese Soviet Republic" and similar organizations and unification of the government power in the hands of the National Government.

3. Absolute cessation of communist propaganda and acceptance of the Three People's Principles.

4. Stoppage of the class struggle.[1]

These points correspond closely to the changes in policy the Communist Party had declared itself willing to make. After having laid down the conditions on which the Communists would be permitted to "start life anew", the Session in its closing manifesto blamed the Communists for terroristic activities since 1927 "thus undermining the nation's strength which otherwise would have been employed in resisting the invader". The cardinal policy of the Kuomintang was declared to

1. See H.G.W. Woodhead, ed., The China Year Book 1938, p. 552; Snow, op. cit., p. 470; Chinese Ministry of Information, China Handbook 1937-1945, p. 66.

RESTRICTED

be the eradication of the Communist scourge. However, the achievement of unity through peaceful means was to be the guiding principle, although the Chinese people were warned against the fallacious theories of the class struggle.[1]

These documents established the basic conditions for the entente. During the ensuing months negotiations between the two parties continued. Chou En-lai held discussions with Chiang K'ai-shek and other Kuomintang officials at Kuling, China's summer capital. Other meetings were held within Chinese Communist territory.[2]

Many of the conditions of the entente were implemented during the course of the negotiations. The civil war had ceased. The Communist policies of land confiscation were suspended, and Communist propaganda was preparing the people for the united front. The Kuomintang was making active preparations for increased democratization, including the calling of a People's National Congress for November 1937 to inaugurate a new constitution.[3] Many, though by no means all of the political prisoners held by the Kuomintang were released.

3 Ap.

2. Manifesto of the Chinese Communist Party.

Apparently public announcement of the entente was originally scheduled for the middle of July 1937, when a Chinese Communist manifesto was handed to the Kuomintang, declaring that Chinese unity

1. See Woodhead, op. cit., 583.
2. Chamberlin, op. cit., pp. 23-4, Bisson, op. cit., p. 183.
3. Due to the war and repeated postponements this congress did not meet until November 1946.

had been restored for the purpose of resisting Japan. Publication of the manifesto was delayed until September 22, 1937, due to the outbreak of hostilities with Japan after the Marco Polo Bridge incident of July 7, 1937.[1]

The manifesto of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, published on September 22, 1937, stated that the Communist Party had "on the basis of peace and national unity and joint resistance against foreign aggression, reached an understanding with the Kuomintang" and proposed the following objectives:

> "(1) Struggle for the independence, liberty and emancipation of the Chinese nation by promptly and swiftly preparing and launching the national revolutionary campaign of resistance...
>
> "(2) Enforce democracy based on the people's rights and convoke the National People's Congress in order to enact the Constitution and decide upon the plans of national salvation.
>
> "(3) Improve the well-being and enrich the livelihood of the Chinese people..."

The manifesto expressed the belief that the whole country would support these objectives, although the program would meet with numerous difficulties, particularly from Japanese imperialism, and declared:

> "(1) The San Min Chu-I enunciated by Dr. Sun Yat-sen is the paramount need of China today. This Party is ready to strive for its enforcement.

1. Rosinger, op. cit., p. 27; Bisson, JAPAN AND CHINA op. cit., p. 187.

"(2) This Party abandons its policy of overthrowing the Kuomintang of China by force and the movement of sovietization, and discontinues its policy of forcible confiscation of land from landowners.

"(3) This Party abolishes the present Soviet Government and will enforce democracy based on the people's rights in order to unify the national political machinery.

"(4) This Party abolishes the Red Army, reorganizes it into the National Revolutionary Army, places it under the direct control of the National Government, and awaits orders for mobilization to share the responsibility of resisting foreign invasion at the front."[1]

3. Statement by Chiang K'ai-shek.

On September 23, 1937, the day following the publication of the Communist manifesto, Chiang K'ai-shek issued a formal statement welcoming the change in Communist policies, in which he said:

"The Manifesto recently issued by the Chinese Communist Party is an outstanding instance of the triumph of national sentiment over every other consideration. The various decisions embodied in the Manifesto, such as the abandonment of a policy of violence, the cessation of Communist propaganda, the abolition of the Chinese Soviet Government, and the disbandment of the Red Army are all essential conditions for mobilising our national strength in order that we may meet the menance from without and guarantee our own national existence.

"These decisions agree with the spirit of the Manifesto and resolutions adopted by the Third Plenary Session of the

1. Full text given in Rosinger, op. cit., p. 96.

Kuomintang. The Communist Party's Manifesto declares that the Chinese Communists are willing to strive to carry out the Three Principles. This is ample proof that China today has only one objective in its war efforts."[1]

4. Implementation of the Agreements.

During 1937 and 1938 a number of concrete steps were taken to implement the entente and to further the united resistance against the Japanese invasion. By order of the National Government the Chinese Communist Army was reorganized as the Eighth Route Army, with the Communist generals Chu Teh and P'eng Te-huai as commander and vice-commander, and Lin Piao, He Lung, and Liu Po-ch'eng as division commanders. The Eighth Route Army was designated to garrison the area of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia (Shan-Kan-Ning) border region, the former Soviet area. Shortly afterwards the Communists, whose area of control was expanding as a result of their guerilla warfare efforts, established the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei (Chin-Cha-Chi) border region government under the National Government. The Chin-Cha-Chi regional government received the sanction of the National Government in January 1938; it was the only Communist-dominated local government to receive such formal sanction. During the first three years of the entente the Communist armies received a monetary subsidy from the National Government, as

1. The full text of Chiang's statement is given in Rosinger, op. cit., p. 99, and in Chiang K'ai-shek, Resistance and Reconstruction, pp. 20-21, New York, 1943.

well as a small allotment of ammunition.

In addition the National Government carried out a number of measures regarding civil rights and greater democratization, although due to wartime conditions it did not call the National Assembly into session to act on China's new constitution. The Communist Party was permitted to publish its own newspaper, the Hsin Hua Jih-Pao (New China Daily), in Hankow. (This Communist paper continued to be published in Nationalist territory throughout the war.) Chou En-lai was one of the seventeen members of the presidium of the Extraordinary National Congress of the ~~KMT~~ Kuomintang in March and April 1938, and was appointed Vice-Minister of the Political Training Board of the National Military Council, a position he held until 1940.

Among the more important steps towards increased democracy and freedom of discussion taken by the Kuomintang during this period was the creation by the Extraordinary National Congress of the KMT in March 1938 of the People's Political Council (PPC), with powers to discuss and question all important government measures and to make proposals to the government. Although the PPC was purely advisory, the prestige of its members and the caliber of its discussions made it a significant body.

The most important policies of this period are embodied in the "Program of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction", which was adopted by the Kuomintang Party Congress on April 1, 1938 and

subsequently by the PPC. The "Program" was accepted by both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party as the basic outline of principles to be followed by the wartime entente, subsidiary only to the San Min Chu-I (Three People's Principles).[1]

The period during which the National Government was located at Hankow marked the high point of Kuomintang-Communist cooperation. In spite of continued defeats of the Chinese armies by Japan, the solidarity of the Chinese people created a spirit of optimism. Chiang K'ai-shek emerged as the symbol of the nation's unity and of eventual victory.

5. Deterioration of Kuomintang-Communist Relations

In the latter half of 1938 relations between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party began to deteriorate. At the end of August the Hankow-Wuchang Defense Headquarters, outlawed three Communist-sponsored mass-organizations, because it feared the Communists would use them to gain influence in nationalist territory.

After the fall of Hankow in October 1938, Communist-Kuomintang relations worsened steadily. More Communist organizations were suppressed. The Communists were attacked for failing to yield control over their area in Shensi Province to the National Government, and for not allowing the National Government to exercise direct command over

1. Text is given in Chinese Ministry of Information, China Handbook, 1937-1945, pp. 79-81, and in Linebarger, The China of Chiang K'ai-shek, pp. 309-312.

RESTRICTED

the Communist armies in the field and to direct their training.

In the following years relations between the two parties remained strained, and charges and countercharges of failure to abide by the promises of 1937 became increasingly violent, often leading to local clashes between Chinese National and Communist forces. The one policy common to both parties was resistance against the Japanese invasion, and even this was often neglected amid the jockeying for advantage between the two parties. However the resumption of open hostilities on a large scale was avoided. During 1939 the National Government, at that time located in Chungking, began to enforce a rigid military blockade of the Communist areas to prevent Communist infiltration into Nationalist China. The expansion of Communist military forces into areas outside the regional defense zones assigned them by the National Government led to incidents and continuous skirmishes between the Communists and Nationalists. The arguments and fighting over the demarcation between Communist and Nationalist military zones culminated in the "New Fourth Army Incident" of January 1941, the most serious war-time clash between Nationalist and Communist armies. The fighting reached such proportions that it received world-wide attention.

RESTRICTED

6. Kuomintang-Communist Negotiations

In spite of the frequent military friction between the Communist and Nationalist forces, the Government's policy remained that of seeking a political settlement with the Communists. On March 6, 1941, in reference to the "New Fourth Army Incident" in a speech to the PPC, the chief arena in which attempts were made to settle the issues between the Communists and Kuomintang, Chiang K'ai-shek said:

> "... the Government is solely concerned with leading the nation against the Japanese invaders and extirpating the traitors, and is utterly without any notion of again taking up arms to 'suppress the Communists'. ... Provided unity can be preserved and resistance carried on to the end, the Government will be ready to follow your directions [i.e. the directions of the PPC] in the settlement of all outstanding questions."[1]

No settlement was reached between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party, however, and the relations between the two armies continued strained, with periodic fighting, while at the meetings of the PPC a group of minor parties continued attempts at mediation. These minor parties had formed the "United National Construction League"[2] at the end of 1939, with the principal object of preserving Kuomintang-Communist cooperation. Minor parties played an important, if

1. Chiang's speech is given in full in Rosinger, op. cit. p. 116, ff.
2. This League went through several reorganizations and finally became known as the Democratic League.

unsuccessful, role in the negotiations between the Communists and the Kuomintang prior to the offer by Ambassador Hurley of American good offices.

Attempts to settle the Kuomintang-Communist differences were not limited to discussions and statements before the PPC. On a number of occasions direct negotiations between Communist and Nationalist officials took place. The first of these occasions were the talks between General Ho Ying-ch'in, Minister of War in the National Government, and Chin Pang-hsien (Po Ku), a member of the CCP Central Committee, early in 1940.

In September 1943 Chiang K'ai-shek gave explicit instructions to the 11th Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang that the Chinese Communist problem should be handled by peaceful means:

> "After hearing the Secretariat's report on the question of the Chinese Communist Party and the views expressed by various members of the Central Executive Committee, I am of the opinion that first of all we should clearly recognise that the Communist problem is a purely political problem and should be solved by political means. Such ought to be the guiding principle for the Plenary Session in its effort to settle this matter."[1]

1. The full text is given in Rosinger, L. K., op. cit., China's Wartime Politics, 1937-1944, Princeton, 1944, pp. 124-6.

Following the 11th Plenary Session, Communist General Lin Piao conducted negotiations in Chungking during November 1943 with respect to the reorganization of the Communist forces.

More comprehensive discussions between representatives of the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party began in Sian in May 4, 1944. The Government was represented at these talks by General Chang Chih-chung of the National Military Council and Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, then Minister of Information. The Communists were represented by Lin Tzu-han, an important member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Chang, Wang, and Lin returned to Chungking on May 14, 1944, and continued the negotiations through an exchange of memoranda until September, when the negotiations were discussed in detailed reports to the PPC by Chang Chih-chung and Lin Tzu-han.

During these discussions the following major points were brought up:

1. The disposition, size, command, and training of the Communist armies.

2. The relationship between Communist-organized regional governments and the National Government.

3. Problems connected with civil rights and especially the legalization of the Communist Party and its activities in Nationalist areas.

Incidental to these points a number of problems arose connected with

the implementation of various pledges made by the Communist Party and the Kuomintang throughout the period of Kuomintang-Communist entente. During these discussions the question of constitutional government arose, and suggestions for "coalition government" were brought forth for the first time.

Although no settlement was reached on the basis of these discussions, they show that from May to September the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist Party were seeking a peaceful settlement of their disputes through political negotiations.

In September 1944 the negotiations went into a new phase, with the arrival of General Hurley as the personal representative of the President of U.S. (with the mission) of rehabilitating the existing political arrangements between the Chinese Government and the Communist Party and ensuring China's continued resistance to Japan.

center copy RESTRICTED

IV. The Outlook for Peace and Stability in China in September 1944

In September 1944, when General Hurley arrived in Chungking as the President's personal representative, China had been fighting Japan for seven years. 1944 was a crucial year in the war. It was essential that China's power to continue her resistance not be destroyed by resumption of large scale hostilities between Communist and Government forces.

The principal hopeful factor in the Chinese situation in September 1944 was that the ~~"united front"~~ "united front" against Japan was still in existence. The avowed policy of both Communists and Nationalists was to seek a political settlement of outstanding differences. Civil war had not broken out on a full scale; negotiations were continuing. Informed observers could cite some considerations which seemed to form the sucessful conclusion of those negotiations, and other considerations which seemed to make a political settlement difficult, if not impossible.

Among the factors that seemed to indicate that a settlement between the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communists could be effected peacefully were the following:

(a) The Similarity of Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Programs.

1, Telegraphic report to the Department of State on December 24, 1944. Quoted from Stuart's memorandum.

Since 1937 both parties had officially based their policies on Sun Yat-sen's San Min Chu I and on the "Program of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction" adopted in 1938. Programs such as agrarian reform, reduction of land rents, and control of the abuses of capitalism were among the stated objectives of each party.

(b) The Nation-wide Desire for Domestic Peace. China's desire for internal peace had been demonstrated by the patriotic upsurge that preceded the anti-Japanese war. If there was one overwhelming desire among even the otherwise politically apathetic Chinese masses it was for peace after victory over Japan. Avoidance of civil war was the official policy of each party.

(c) The Need for Post-War Reconstruction. After twenty-six years of revolution and civil war, followed by seven years of war against Japan, China in 1944 was in desperate need of large-scale reconstruction, and this need was recognized by most thinking Chinese.

(d) Moderates and Liberals in Each Party. In addition to a core of intransigents both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party had many adherents who placed the needs of China ahead of those of the party. Many of these had joined or become associated with the parties because of their desire to aid in the war or because

RESTRICTED

they were attracted by the program of reform each party advocated.

(c) Ideological factors. The ideology of both parties spoke of reconstruction and modernization as the immediate needs of China. Differences in the concepts of revolution and the ultimate aims did not necessarily preclude the continuation of the war-time entente for the purpose of reconstruction. The Kuomintang's phase of "constitutional government", scheduled to be proclaimed shortly after the war, and the Chinese Communists' "New Democracy" had much in common.

Other factors, however, seemed to speak against a peaceful settlement between the Government and the Chinese Communists. The following may be especially noted:

(a) Extremists in Each Party. The Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party each contained a core of extremists, who opposed any compromise settlement and did not believe in the good faith of the other party. Their mutual mistrust, born of years of civil war and intrigue, was stronger than any other consideration.

(b) Ideological Factors. Although the ideology of neither party precluded a peaceful settlement, ideology was also a negative factor. The Communists believed in the ultimate socialist revolution and the class struggle, while the Kuomintang was, according to theory

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

preparing to initiate Constitutional government under which further revolution and the class struggle was to be avoided.

(c) Communist Fear of Repeating the Errors of 1924-7. Both parties were extremely conscious of the precedents set by the period of Communist-Kuomintang collaboration in 1924-27. The Communists, who had been defeated in 1927, felt that their principal error had been that of "right opportunism" and "first and foremost the shameful and criminally neglectful attitude to the winning of the National Revolutionary Army and its commanding officers to the arming of the workers and peasants and the establishment of real revolutionary troops with a Communist backbone."1 The Chinese Communist Army had been maintained throughout the war virtually without change except in name, and the Communist forces were kept under strict Communist control, with the leading military command exercised by top-ranking Communists.

(d) Kuomintang Fear of Repeating the Errors of 1924-27. The Kuomintang was as clearly aware of the 1924-27 precedent as the Communist Party. Much of Kuomintang intransigence can be traced to a fear of permitting the Communist Party to regain the influence within the government that was wrested from it in 1927 only by drastic measures. The Kuomintang's power in China rested to a large degree on its control of the national army. The Kuomintang hesitated to share this control with the Communists

1. Wang Ming, "Fifteen Years of Struggle", in Mao Tse-tung, et al., China, the March toward Unity, New York, 1937.

and was anxious to eliminate the military independence of the Communist Party.

The major imponderable factor in 1944 was the attitude of the USSR and of international Communism. On the aggregate, however, the outlook for a peace and stability in China in September 1944 was not hopeless. It seemed to the best interest of the National Government, the Chinese Communists, and of the USSR and the United States that China should play the maximum role in the common war effort and enter the postwar period as a united nation, prepared to make a major contribution to regional reconstruction.

R+ A4963

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE THIRD PLENARY SESSION OF THE FIFTH CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND CENTRAL SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE OF THE KUOMINTANG

FEBRUARY 21, 1937[1]

No reconciliation is possible with the communist-bandits until and unless they sincerely repent of their past mistake, obey the Three People's Principles, abide by the nation's laws, strictly adhere to military discipline, and behave as good citizens of the Republic--this was one of the important resolutions reached by the Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee at its sixth general meeting this afternoon.

1. Abolition of the Chinese Red Army; and unification of the command of the nation's armed forces;
2. Unification of the governing power in the hands of the Central Government, and dissolution of the so-called "Chinese Soviet Republic" and other organizations detrimental to governmental unity;
3. Absolute cessation of the Communistic propaganda which is diametrically opposed to the Three People's Principles; and
4. Stoppage of class struggle which splits society into antagonistic classes and then incites them into killing each other off.

The resolution, which was sponsored by the presidium of the Plenary Session comprising, General Chiang Kai-shek, Mr. Wang Ching-wei, General Feng Yu-hsiang, Mr. Tai Chi-tao, Mr. Yu Yu-jen, Mr. Sun Fo, Mr. Wang Fa-chin, Mr. Tsou Lu and Chu Cheng, began with a historical account of the communists in Chinese politics:-

When the communists were individually admitted by Dr. Sun Yat-sen into the Kuomintang in 1924, the resolution stated, they promised to work for

1. Central News Agency, Nanking, February 21, 1937.

work for the cause of national revolution, but they did not keep their promise. Working under the cover of the Kuomintang, they soon set out privately to create imaginary camps within the Kuomintang. Then they followed it up with attempts at actually splitting the party.

At the beginning, the Kuomintang still wished to be lenient and tolerant toward them, hoping at the same time that they would soon wake up to their mistake. After the Nationalist forces had taken Hengchow and Changsha in Hunan in 1926 and later extended their occupation to the Wuhan area, the communistic elements tried to sever the ties between the Kuomintang and the masses.

Alongside with these subversive activities, they propagated Red theories and plotted the downfall of the revolutionary and national construction movement led by the Kuomintang. They also tried their best to hinder the eastward movement of the Nationalist forces to take Shanghai and Nanking as well as the northward march to Chengchow and Loyang of another column of the revolutionary troops.

They were also responsible for the reign of terror in Hunan and Hupeh. Likewise, they perpetrated the heart-rending event, namely, the division between Nanking and Hankow. Because of the communists' anti-revolutionary activities, the Northern Expedition almost came to a standstill.

Later, they openly organized the Chinese Red Army, demoralized the basic structure in the Kuomintang. They incited class warfare in hope to seize governing power.

In order to consolidate the foundation of the party, in order to carry the Northern Expedition to a successful conclusion, and in order to save the people from sufferings, the Kuomintang came upon the momentous decision of purging its rank and file of communistic elements in 1927.

After

After that for more than ten years, the communists continued their propaganda among the youths on the one hand and on the other created disturbances at various provinces. Among them the provinces of Kiangsi, Kwangtung, Fukien, Chekiang, Hunan, Hupeh suffered the most.

Having the protection of the people as its major responsibility, the Central Government found it necessary to seek the annihilation of the communist-bandits by armed forces. Thanks for the heroism of the armed comrades, the government troops had succeeded in up-rooting them from their strong-holds. Thus, peace and order were restored in regions where for many years there had been a reign of terror.

Since their general collapse in Kiangsi in 1935, the communist-bandits have been fleeing through Hunan, Kweichow, Yunnan, to Szechwan, Kansu, Shensi, Ninghsia, and Shansi. They not only threatended and terrorized the people, but also brutally killed them. Houses were burned down ruthlessly and nothing was left undone to destroy the economic institutions both in cities and in the villages

These are all facts, which need no item-by-item enumeration. What broke the people's heart most is what has happened since September 18, 1931 when China was plunged into a grave national crisis. The entire nation, under the leadership of the Central Government, pulled together their resources and energies for national defense and economic reconstruction.

Taking advantage of the situation, when the government was busy with the external meance, the communists attacked Kangchow in Kiangsi during the Shanghai war. Later during the hostilities along the Great Wall in 1933, they attacked Fuchow and almost meanced Nanchang, provincial capital of Kiangsi. These all had the same effect of hindering the free movement of government troops in national defense.

Other

Other activities of the communists in weakening China's national defense and sapping the people's vitality each surpassed the other in ruthlessness and thoroughness. It is no accident that there should be such a nation-wide wrath against the communist-bandits.

Now having been driven to the northwestern corner of the country where livelihood is difficult and where foodstuffs are scarce, the communist-bandits began to spread reports of their alleged willingness to surrender.

With universal brotherhood at heart, the Kuomintang is not disposed to deprive any people of a chance to reform and start life anew. However, in view of their past deceitfulness and in view of the pitfalls of the former leniency of the Kuomintang, the past mistake must not be repeated.

Continuing, the resolution stated the above-mentioned four items as the minimum conditions before the Government will consider a change in its anti-communist policy.

In conclusion, the resolution declared that no nation on earth can tolerate the existence within its territory of any organization which is detrimental to the interests of the state and the whole people and which depends on external forces for its activities. For the preservation of the past glory of the Republic and the consummation of the Three People's Principles, the Red scourge must be annihilated root and branch.